American University in Cairo

AUC Knowledge Fountain
Papers, Posters, and Presentations
2018

Curbing Corruption in Egypt: A Focus on Local Administration
Reform /  تركيز على إصالح اإلدارة:مكافحة الفساد في مصر
المحلية
Amira Gamal El-Din The American University in Cairo AUC, amiragamaleldin@aucegypt.edu
Rawda Saeed Ali The American University in Cairo AUC, Rawda@aucegypt.edu
Reem Abughattas The American University in Cairo AUC, reem.abughattas@aucegypt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/studenttxt
Part of the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons

Recommended Citation
Gamal El-Din, Amira; Ali, Rawda Saeed; and Abughattas, Reem, "Curbing Corruption in Egypt: A Focus on
Local Administration Reform / 2018) " تركيز على إصالح اإلدارة المحلية:)مكافحة الفساد في مصر. Papers,
Posters, and Presentations. 57.
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/studenttxt/57

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Papers, Posters, and Presentations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For
more information, please contact fountadmin@aucegypt.edu.

Curbing Corruption in Egypt:
A Focus on Local Administration Reform

Prepared by
Amira Gamal El-Din
Rawda Saeed Ali
Reem Abughattas
Supervised by
Dr. Khaled Abdelhalim

Assistant Professor
Department of Public Policy and Administration
The School of Global Affaires and Public Policy
The American University in Cairo

2018

Curbing Corruption in Egypt:
A Focus on Local Administration Reform
Prepared by*
Amira Gamal El-Din
Rawda Saeed Ali
Reem Abughattas
Supervised by
Dr. Khaled Abdelhalim

Assistant Professor
Department of Public Policy and Administration
The School of Global Affaires and Public Policy
The American University in Cairo

2018
* Names listed in alphabetical order

Published by The Public Policy HUB
The School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

Project Director:
Dr. Laila El Baradei, Professor of Public Administration
Project Co-Director:
Dr Shahjahan Bhuiyan, Associate Professor of Public
Administration & Associate Dean of Undergraduate
Studies & Administration
Project Manager:
Mohamed Kadry, MPP
Project Coordinator:
Waleed El Deeb

Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations .........................................................................4
Foreword ..........................................................................................5
Additional Remarks ...........................................................................6
I. Introduction ...................................................................................7
II. Significance of the Problem ..........................................................8
a. Manifestations of Corruption ..............................................8
1. Public Utilities and Public Services Provision ..................9
2. Building and Construction Permits ..................................9
3. The Five Development Programs ...................................10
b. Implications of Corruption ...............................................10
1. Egypt’s Business Image and International Reputation .......11
2. Trust Gap between the Government and Citizens .................11
3. Cultural Ramifications .................................................12
III. What is Wrong Exactly? .............................................................12
1. Narrow Framing of Corruption ......................................12
2. Complexity of the Local Administration System: .............13
3. Excessive Centralization ..............................................15
4. Constraining Legal Framework ......................................15
5. Weak Follow-up, Monitoring and Audit System ...............16
a. Preventive Control ...................................................17
b. Detective Control .....................................................20
6. Lack of Integrated and Locally Directed State Efforts ......22
IV. Strategic Directions and Engines of Change .................................23
a. Strategic Directions .........................................................24
b. Engines of Change ..........................................................25
1. Local Administration CODES ........................................25
2. Local Administration CONTROL ....................................26
3. Implementation CAPACITY ...........................................27
4. CULTURE of Rule of Law .............................................27
V. Leading Vehicle of Implementation ..............................................30

List of Abbreviations
ACA			

Administrative Control Agency

CAO			

Central Audit Organization

CAOA			

Central Agency for Organization and Administration

CSOs 		Civil Society Organizations
FMD			

Field Monitoring Department

GoE			

Government of Egypt

ICT			

Information and Communication Technology

IFA			

Inspection and Follow up Agency

KPIs			

Key Performance Indicators

LC			

Local Council

LCPI			

Local Corruption Perception Index

M&E			

Monitoring and Evaluation

MoLD 		

Ministry of Local Development

NACS			

National Anti-Corruption Strategy

NGOs			

Non-Governmental Organizations

PMD			

Plan and Monitoring Department

SDS 2030

Sustainable Development Strategy 2030

4

Foreword
The objective of this work is to provide a comprehensive picture of corruption
in the local administration system in Egypt and to present a persuasive argument
justifying the policy recommendations presented in the paper. We hope this
document would act as a decision-making tool and a call on the relevant parties
to take action.
This document’s content is divided into four main sections. The first is an introduction
to corruption in Egypt. The second highlights the different manifestations
of corruption in the context of local administration and examines its subsequent
wider, long-term implications on the country. The third section entails a thorough
analysis of the deep-rooted causes of corruption that should be acknowledged
to move beyond the narrow responses to immediate manifestations. The fourth
contains two sets of recommendations: ‘Strategic Directions’ and ‘Engines of
Change,’ where the former advocates for specific structural policies whilst the
latter focuses on action-oriented recommendations.
The methodology used is of a qualitative nature. It relied on both desk research
and primary data.
• Desk research is gathered through a critical review of:
• Existing laws, regulations and decrees, as well as national and international
reports related to the area of investigation.
• Investigative articles and media reports.
• Primary data was obtained through conducting a number of in-depth,
semi-structured interviews with several officials from:
• The Ministry of Local Development (MoLD): as the main ministry responsible
for carrying out local administration reform.
• High-level executive leadership in the governorates’ Diwans of Cairo
and Giza: in order to cover the two largest governorates in Egypt, and to
have a clear understanding on the different roles and responsibilities,
and the operations of local administration.
• Former governors of Alexandria and Dakahliya to clearly understand the
political and administrative aspects of the local administration system.
Data triangulation was ensured through obtaining the data from different sources,
including interviews with former and current officials at different hierarchal levels
in the local administration system, in addition to various reports and articles.
This allowed for presenting diverse perspectives on the problems of the local
administration system in Egypt and the corruption loopholes associated with it.
Furthermore, it allowed for cross-checking and validating the findings.
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Additional Remarks
Before proceeding with the general body of the policy paper. Several points
should be highlighted:
• Local administration in Egypt is multi-faceted, and so is corruption within it.
Along with MoLD, the 27 governorates, numerous service agencies and
directorates, local units at different administrative levels, in addition to
different governmental bodies and audit agencies are included. This
complexity and multiplicity of players made it difficult to limit the policy
paper to just one area of focus in the local administration system, without
taking into consideration the overall environment and contextual challenges.
This is in addition to the entangled nature of the root causes of corruption,
which need to be tackled simultaneously to reach a set of comprehensive
and integrated policy recommendations.
• Most of the analysis contained in this policy paper is not new. However, it
viewed corruption as a multidimensional problem that needs to be tackled
in a wider, more integral process, rather than a stand-alone phenomenon
that needs to be addressed centrally. Furthermore, it considered corruption
within the local framework and thus filled an important contextual gap that
allowed for offering tactical insights and recommendations for curbing
corruption through local administrative reform.
• The recommendations offered are not based on mere adoption of international
best practices, which are highly unlikely to address the wide-ranging
dimensions of the problem. Rather, they are based on contextual realities
that allow for technically feasible solutions to the locally perceived challenges.
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I. Introduction
Corruption is one of the major challenges that cripple societies, limiting the
productivity of public institutions and burdening economic growth around the
world, especially in developing countries. Corruption further increases poverty
rates, discourages investments, undermines development, and contributes to
mistrust between government and citizens. Therefore, it is a multi-faceted
phenomenon that should not be treated as a stand-alone problem.
The situation in Egypt is no different from other countries. While, it is difficult
to accurately identify the magnitude of corruption in Egypt due to the lack of
reliable data and overall corruption assessment carried out by the government,
nevertheless, observers agree that Egypt suffers from a high level of corruption,
especially at the local administration level. They agreed that nepotism (wasta)
and facilitation payments (bribes) were common and necessary for conducting
business; practices that undermine any efforts for economic and social development.
Although the Egyptian government has previously exerted many efforts and
launched a number of initiatives1 to curb corruption in the public sector, these
attempts do not seem to be paying off or attaining the expected outcomes. This
further raises questions about the effectiveness of the role played by anti-corruption
agencies in curbing corruption and calls for rethinking the fight against corruption
beyond anti-corruption rhetoric and traditional tactics.
In this context, this policy paper argues that corruption should be recognized as
a more complex, systemic phenomenon which distorts governmental and local
systems. In turn the government should seek not only to fight corrupt individuals
but also these systemic distortions which produce corruption through reforming
the system. This requires transforming the paradigm within which corruption is
commonly perceived, going beyond the superficial manifestations to pinpoint
the underlying causes instead, in addition to focusing efforts on the broader
context of governance and accountability.

1 Initiatives include the establishment of the National Committee to Combat Corruption in 2008
and the Transparency and Integrity Committee, set up within the Ministry of State for Administrative
Development in 2007 with the aim of diminishing corruption in the public sector.
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II. Significance of the Problem
Globally, the importance of local governments stems from their core competence;
they are basically in charge of everything that touches citizens’ daily lives,
starting from the roads they walk on, the street lights, and the water pipes
feeding their neighborhoods. It also involves waste collection and management,
the educational administration affiliated to their children’s schools, the health
units in their neighborhoods, in addition to services such as obtaining birth
certificates, licenses, and social insurance numbers. Thus, citizens have more
contact with local agencies than with the central ones and this proximity to people
and how local officials exercise these functions can make local government
highly vulnerable to corruption.
Corruption is indeed a challenging problem for any government, especially at
the local level, since it directly reflects on the quality of public services delivered
to citizens and thus significantly affects the level of trust between people and
their governments.

a. Manifestations of Corruption
According to Law No. 43/1979, MoLD has three main responsibilities. On
top is coordinating the relations between the central government and the 27
governorates, especially with regards to providing public utilities and services
through the Service Ministries’ public agencies and local directorates at the
governorates. In addition, it is responsible for coordinating relations between
and across the governorates, besides supervising their activities. Second comes
the issuance of permits, whether for building, construction or demolition. Lastly
is the management of the “Five Development Programs”, which include (1)
Electricity, (2) Roads and Transportation, (3) Environment Enhancement, (4)
Maintaining Security, Firefighting and Traffic Control and (5) Local Units Support.
All of these mandates make the local administration the backbone of economic
growth in Egypt that nurtures development in different sectors, such as education,
health and urban development. Yet, complexity of the local administration with
its multiple cross-cutting relations coupled with a high level of centralization
and weak follow-up systems allowed corruption to spread further and led to
wastefulness in government spending. This has resulted in deteriorating public
services and underperforming systems, which are clearly evident in global rankings,
where Egypt ranked 63/137 in government spending efficiency at the Global
Competitiveness Index 2017-2018.2 Additionally, in 2016, its percentile rank
reached 28 in Government Effectiveness at the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI).3 Clear manifestations of corruption can be mirrored in the following:
2 World Economic Forum. (2018). The Global Competitiveness Report 2017–2018. Geneva: World
Economic Forum.
3 World Bank. (2016). Worldwide Governance Indicators. Retrieved from (http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports).
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1. Public Utilities and Public Services Provision
Governorates hold a degree of responsibility with regards to the spread of corruption
in the utilities and services provision, due to the lack of coordination between
central and local levels. Forms of corruption in this category vary from providing
exaggerated measurements and pricings (fake costs), non-operating public facilities,
poor quality of services to the absence of promised services and utilities. For
example, with regards to water and sanitation utilities, a key official in MoLD
has stated that he coincidentally came across sanitary drainage estimate costs
of 4,700 EGP per pipe, although the pipes were awarded for 2,500 EGP each.
This has resulted in a 245 million EGP waste/theft of public resources.
Moreover, regarding health services, the official added that in Sohag governorate,
there are 90 health units that were built three years ago and remain closed until
now, due to a relatively trivial financial shortage in the completion phase.
Local health units in general and especially in rural areas suffer from shortages
in doctors, nurses, medical supplies and high absenteeism rates. This case
presents corruption in the form of poor management of resources and waste
of money, time and efforts provided to build the 90 health units without using
them for citizens’ benefit.

2. Building and Construction Permits
Issuing permits is considered one of the most hazardous aspects of corruption
in the local administration, due to weak monitoring systems, lack of rule of law
and ineffectiveness in deterring violations; all of which have led to additional
accumulative problems. For instance, according to the Ministry of Housing and
Urban Communities, 90% of the total real estate, (around 4.9 million buildings)
are incompliant with building laws and code standards, among which 317,948
buildings are built without licenses.4 This explains the three million requests
for electrical installation in illegal and unlicensed houses, as stated by a Former
Minister of Local Development. Such a high rate of illegal housing urged the
Cabinet of Ministers to agree on installing electricity in informal houses that
are illegally using electricity. Although this decision was taken based on its
economic return to prevent further electricity theft, however it contradicts a law
article that bans installing any public utilities to violating buildings and illegal
houses.
In addition to the building and construction permits, there are 356,507 demolishing
orders that have not been implemented, as well as 2,685 cases related to
violations of building on agricultural lands in court.5 This is reflected in Egypt’s
4 Al-Shwadfy, Nermine. (2018). Allaf Al-Bashar Ala Kwaem Al-Mawt {Thousands of People on Death
Row}. Al-Ahram Newspaper. Retrieved from: (www.ahram.org.eg/News/131787/38/468907/-آالف/حوادث
املوت-قوائم-عىل-البرش.aspx)
5 Choucri, Mai. (2014). Urban encroachment eats up agricultural land. Egypt Independent. Retrieved
from (http://www.egyptindependent.com/urban-encroachment-eats-agricultural-land-please-copyeditand-publish-asap/)
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lagging rank in Regulatory Enforcement, which scored 110th place out of 113
countries.6 In a similar vein, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR)7
revealed that 392 buildings collapsed in just one year between 2012 and 2013
across Egypt, leaving 192 people killed and 824 families homeless.
Furthermore buildings constructed on agricultural lands have tripled since 2011
reaching 850,000 cases of encroachment in 2013, leading to a loss in 16,000
to 20,000 hectares of agricultural land under urbanization.8

3. The Five Development Programs
Although the five development programs are considered the core competence
of local administration, nevertheless they suffer from corruption in the form of
mismanagement, especially in programs of “Environment Enhancement”, which
is mainly related to garbage collection and “Roads & Transportation.” For example,
with regards to the Environment Enhancement Program, most governorates do
not have a cleaning and beautification agency that primarily focuses on garbage
collection. Instead, they have an environmental department in their Diwan that
falls short of sufficient resources and, therefore, cannot extend its services beyond
certain cities. This has resulted in high generation of municipal solid waste in
the 27 governorates that mostly ends up in open, public and arbitrary dumpsites,
causing serious threats to public health and the environment.9
As for the Roads & Transportation Program, though any mass transport service
should not operate within the governorate/city/markaz without being affiliated
to and regulated by the local administration, 85% of transportation in Egypt
is informal. This is a clear example of the absence of government regulation
and accountability, as well as the loss of an important source of income for the
governorate and its municipalities.10

b. Implications of Corruption
Corruption is not only manifested visually as in the examples given above, but it
has evolved to become bigger in magnitude, severity and complexity. Activities
and actions at the local level hit more macro level issues that constitute the
country’s wellbeing as demonstrated in Figure (1). These have implications on
wider issues that are not taken into account when evaluating the cost of corruption
taking place at the local administration. Such implications are neither monetary
nor calculated, yet their costs are high politically, economically and socially.
6 World Justice Project. (2018). Rule of Law Index 2017–2018. Washington, D.C.: The World Justice
Project.
7 EIPR. (2014). Ma waraa zaheret Enhiar Al-Akarat Fi Misr. {The Phenomenon Beyond the Collapse
of Buildings in Egypt}. Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights. Retrieved from (https://eipr.org/
press/2014/06/الحصيلة-حول-تفاعليًا-موق ًعا-تطلق-املرصية-املبادرة-مرص-يف-العقارات-انهيار-ظاهرة-وراء-) ما
8 Choucri, Mai. (2014).
9 GIZ. (2018). Country Report on The Solid Waste Management in Egypt. Cairo: Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).
10 Interview with an expert consultant in MoLD.
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Figure (1): Deep-Rooted Impact of Corruption
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1. Egypt’s Business Image and International Reputation
Corruption impairs economic growth, harms development, drives away private
investment and encourages a shadow economy. In viewing the major Worldwide
Indices, Egypt appears to be among the lowest ranks. In the Global Competitiveness
Index (GCI) Report 2017-2018, Egypt ranked 100 out of 137 countries. Corruption
ranked as the third factor, after political instability and inflation, as problematic to
doing business.11 Moreover, Egypt ranked 128th among 190 countries in Ease
of Doing Business in 2017.12 Such indicators negatively affect the country’s
worldwide image and reputation, which consequently create obstacles to local
and foreign direct investment, and damages potential opportunities of development.

2. Trust Gap between the Government and Citizens
Public perception of corruption is often linked to a decline in the trust in governments.
The fact that local administration touches peoples’ daily lives and that it
represents half of government employment 13 leads to a misconception
and exaggeration of the real size of corruption at the local level by the media
and the general public. This exaggeration coupled with poor service provision,
partially resulting from corruption, instigates mistrust between citizens and the
government, which consequently impacts the country’s political stability.
Looking at the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Egypt ranked 108 out of 175
countries scoring 34 out of 100,14 which reveals the magnitude of mistrust
11 World Economic Forum. (2018). The Global Competitiveness Report 2017–2018. Geneva: World
Economic Forum.
12 World Bank Group. (2018). Doing Business 2018 - Economy profile - Egypt. World Bank Group.
13 Interview with high official in MOLD
14 Transparency International. (2018). Transparency International - Egypt. Retrieved from (https://
www.transparency.org/country/EGY)
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between citizens and government. This further explains why ‘curbing corruption
at the local level’ has acquired double significance after 2011, and has been
placed on top of the agendas of successive Egyptian governments, since
corruption was one of the main reasons for the revolution.

3. Cultural Ramifications
The proliferation of corruption has left a deep cultural impact on society. According to a
survey by Transparency International, around 50% of Egyptian public service users
paid bribes during 2015 to obtain legally entitled services.15 This indicates that
corruptive behavior is not only accepted as a norm, but has also transformed
into an embedded culture, which is evidently reflected in the decision of the
Cabinet of Ministers16 to violate the law for economic gains. Such shortsighted
policies and decisions – choosing short-term economic benefit without regard
to the consequences – endanger the rule of law and reveal the government’s
awareness of its failure to control corruption. Furthermore, they directly
contribute to embedding a culture of misconduct and legal violation within
society, leading to systemic and structural corruption, which further enlarges
the problem and ends up causing more damage.

III. What is Wrong Exactly?
Clearly, the manifestations and implications of corruption are massive and
negatively impact the country’s social and economic situation. Thus, attention
should be directed beyond these manifestations to encompass the root causes
that are certainly related to the local administration system. In an attempt to
identify these root causes, the following themes were investigated and analyzed
below:

1. Narrow Framing of Corruption
The framing of any problem devises solutions on how to deal with its consequences. In
the Egyptian context, the common definition and perception of corruption place
significant emphasis on its financial-related forms, such as bribery, embezzlement,
fraud, etc. While there is consensus on controlling such malpractices that
obstruct development and undermine the effectiveness of local administration,
corruption should be acknowledged as a complex phenomenon that has multiple
forms, rather than a limited, stand-alone problem. It needs to be understood as
part of broader dynamics that are deeply rooted in political, economic, administrative,
cultural, and social factors.
Presumably, the structural nature of the political and cultural factors is the
foundation of the root causes of this phenomenon and have led to its proliferation.
The political factor constitutes the space allowed by the government for corruption
to be employed as a means of exercising pressure over citizens and bureaucrats
15 Transparency International. (2016). People and Corruption: Middle East & North Africa Survey
2016. Berlin: Transparency International.
16 Please refer back to manifestation P. 5.
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for political gains. Hence, the cultural factor emerged as a result of the political
factor whereby citizens and bureaucrats were emboldened to participate in the
grey areas of corruption tolerated by the government, without consideration to
the magnitude of corruption be it petty or grand. This affected the culture of the
public sector administrative and expanded the problem, leading to systematic
corruption. Consequently, it has turned into a society-wide phenomenon rather
than just a government-related one.
Moreover, the level of corruption in any administrative system is interrelated
with the extent to which accountability, transparency, integrity, efficiency, rule
of law, and citizen participation are mainstreamed in the administrative system.
Therefore, defining “corruption” should go beyond the common limited
perception of financial irregularities and shift towards the effectiveness of the
administrative system, which either allows for or curbs corruption. That is why,
in relating curbing corruption to good governance, it is important to identify
“Rule of Law”, “Participation” and “Accountability” as leading principles with
“Transparency” as prerequisites.

2. Complexity of the Local Administration System
The local administration system in Egypt is complex. Its intricacy originates
from several factors; a) its size, which is reflected in the existence of a large
number of local administration levels and units (27 Governorates- 186 Markaz
- 225 Cities- 85 Districts - 4737 Villages) as well as the large number of
government employees working at the local level, amounting to approximately
three million – half of the total number of civil servants employed by the Egyptian government. b) The overlap of local and executive government supervision,
which results from the conflicting powers, absence of specific goals and clear
division of responsibilities between local and central levels of government, as
well as ineffective communication and cooperation mechanisms. In more detail, this can be depicted in the structure, mandates and capacities at the local
level as follows:
• There is no standardization for the structure formation of the governorate’s
Diwan among the 27 governorates. The changes in the structure take place
arbitrarily and irrationally based on the philosophy of each governor. Some
governors perceive the importance of creating new departments within the
structure, but when the governor leaves the position, these departments
might not carry the same importance with the superseding governor. This
absence of any criteria to guide the decisions of establishing new or restructuring
existing organizational units has contributed to the present bloated state
apparatus which makes it harder to curb corruption.
• The mandates of the local administration system are vague. For instance,
the governor is the head of the executive authority at the local level, but
with unclear and unrealistic mandates provided in Law 47/1979 of the
local administration. He/she is responsible for overseeing security, ethics
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and public order, without these being clearly defined. His/her authorities are
limited to general supervision or proposing plans. Hence, governors cannot
take basic decisions in their governorates, since the public agencies existing
in their jurisdiction fall under the authority of central ministries. Furthermore,
the mandates of the executive leadership, which is represented in the Secretary
General and the Assistant Secretary General, are not clearly identified in
Law 47/1979 and its Executive Regulations. For example, the Law provided
only one sentence regarding the role of the Secretary General stating that he/
she is responsible for the financial and administrative issues related to the
governorate Diwan. For the Assistant Secretary General, the Law also stated
that his/her only role is to assist the Secretary General and act on his/her behalf
in case of absence. In most cases, the roles of the executive leadership are
shaped by the power and character of the governor. The executive leadership
at the lower levels (Markaz, City, District and Village) does not have mandates
in the Law or its Executive Regulations. Also, it can be assumed that they
practice the same mandates of the executive leadership at the governorate
level; such replication of mandates does not take into consideration the
division of responsibilities between the different administrative levels. Moreover,
some of the departments under the governorate’s Diwan have similar mandates,
which muddles the flow of work and consequently affects the quality of
service provision. This ambiguity in the mandates and responsibilities of
crucial, high-ranking positions does not allow for a clear line of accountability,
which in turn entrenches corruption in local governance and adversely impacts
the effectiveness of the local administration system.
• The personnel system and capacity of local civil servants constitute a
cornerstone in the local administration system, which can – in part – account
for the proliferation of corruption at the local level. The appointment process
and procedures in the local administration system lack clarity regarding a
career path where local personnel can grow in their professions bottom up.
None of Egypt’s constitutions and laws from 1923 onwards contain clauses
about the selection of governors, head of markaz or district. All of these
posts are appointed by the executive branch of the central government without
explicit functional standards or qualities, where the President directly
appoints governors and the Minister of Local Development appoints all other
executive positions at lower subnational levels. Even though MoLD has the
authority to appoint some of these executive positions, there has been an
ongoing political arrangement in Egypt to fill these positions from certain
ranks, without consideration to functional standards.
• The pay and compensation system is another challenging area, since
employees at local government bodies receive the least wages, compared
to workers at different state sectors. Decisions to increase salaries, transfer
and/or replace officials, and promotions are all subject to seniority regulations
and strict manners. Whilst such a system originally strived for fair criteria
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among officials and attempted to avoid nepotism, it has led to negative outcomes
including disappointment, job negligence and a sense of detachment from
the system.
• Furthermore, the reluctance to delegate authority and the way decisions
are made between central and local government are some of the issues
affecting the development of human resources at the local level. There is
a tendency among high-level staff and directors in central government to
handle most of the local affairs centrally, thus leaving a limited role for local
staff and directors. This trend has reflected negatively on local staff in different
ways. It has lowered their aspirations to work actively, and weakened the
trust between the central and local officials, therein leading to a dependency
prevalent among local officials towards central government. This takes us to
the next point, which highly affects the future of local administration and is
pivotal in fighting corruption in Egypt.

3. Excessive Centralization
Egypt is considered one of the most centralized countries in the world, ranking
114 out of 158 countries in decentralization and government closeness to the
people, according to a study by the World Bank.17 Perhaps shifting from "local
governance" to "local administration” as per the law, reflects its limited role
with regards to the decision-making process and fiscal powers, which is in turn
mirrored in the deteriorating situation of service delivery. The centralized system
has been contributing to the increased levels of complexity and corruption, as
well as to the poor local leadership, unequal distribution of funds among
governorates and the lack of trust between citizens and the government.
Moreover, with regards to achieving the constitutional obligations, the Government
of Egypt (GoE) has not taken any serious steps towards transforming to fiscal,
economic and administrative decentralization. This complex, highly centralized
system has resulted in widening the developmental gaps and increasing the
poverty levels, especially in Upper Egypt.

4. Constraining Legal Framework
Effective local administration and delivery of services are very challenging and
require well-targeted, innovative governance approaches accompanied by a
strong legal framework. In Egypt, many of the local administration operations
such as granting building or demolition permits and implementing many services
and development projects through tenders and direct orders are fertile grounds
for corruption and manipulation by officials of local governments. Yet, when
looking at legislative frameworks, reality shows that relevant local administration
laws and regulations often seem more like political declarations that do not
address practical needs for social and economic development.
17 How Close Is Your Government to Its People? Worldwide Indicators on Localization and
Decentralization http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/journalarticles/2014-3
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To start with, the nature of work of localities encompasses formulating local
plans, allocating local budgets, implementing projects, operating, maintaining
and following up on all projects and public services delivered at the local level.
Therefore, the process of local administration is significantly governed, shaped
by and dependent on several related laws beside the Local Administration Law.
However, most debates about the legal reform of the local administration system
in Egypt only consider amending the Law of Local Administration, disregarding
its related laws, such as the Unified Building Law; Planning Law; and State
General Budget Law. These laws collectively determine the degree of
decentralization and the magnitude of role played by citizens in local planning
and overseeing the performance of the various government institutions at the
local level. Hence, they cannot be ignored while talking about curbing corruption
in the local administration.
Identifying the existing problems and bottlenecks in these laws is key to any
reform for several reasons. First, the absence of clear laws and regulations lead
to duplication and overlapping of mandates with all involved actors in the local
administration process, which in turn weakens any monitoring and accountability
mechanisms. Second, curbing corruption can only be achieved through transparency
and clarity of policies, laws and procedures that complement each other. The
dilemma lies in issuing each law separately, discounting its effect on other
systems, laws or processes. Another challenge is the lack of adequate
coordination between central and local levels of the government. This
challenge arises because laws are not clear regarding competence sharing between
the central government and the local government, even though a clear-cut division
of powers between the different tiers of government is the precondition for the
establishment of accountability. Moreover, in certain cases, some ministries
and public authorities do not commit to proper and uniform adherence to laws. 18
Thus, local administration and development processes are frequently hindered
by the maze of conflicting laws and the disintegration between different state
authorities, which do not communicate or see each other, leading to the existing
deteriorated state of public service delivery.

5. Weak Follow-up, Monitoring and Audit System
Robust control systems are imperative for preventing, detecting and responding
to corruption in local governments. They are the bedrock of a high-quality public
sector and a lever for restoring trust in government institutions. Normally, there
are two types of control systems: preventive and detective. The former is proactive
in nature, emphasizes quality, and designed to ensure that departmental and
unit objectives are being met. The latter is subsequent, aiming to ensure that
18 The case of New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA), under the Ministry of Housing, where
New Communities Law No. 59/1979 stipulated that each new town would be managed by a town
development agency under NUCA, but once developed the new towns were to be handed over to
the respective local government authorities and revert to standard municipal local administration.
However, this has not occurred with all new towns like New Cairo, Al-Shorouk and Sixth of October.
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preventive controls are functioning well, and designed to detect any irregularities
after they take place. The importance of both systems emanates from their
fundamentality in determining the degree of accountability, transparency and
participation, which are the foundation of good governance.
In Egypt, as illustrated in Figure (2), the system of preventive control is usually
internal and highly dependent on several, closely linked mechanisms, namely
“Information”; “Local Planning”; and “Follow-up and Monitoring”, in addition
to other complementary mechanisms such as, “Complaints” that provides citizens’
feedback. Meanwhile, the system of detective control involves the elected local
councils and external audit agencies.
Figure (2): Preventive and Detective Control System
Accountability

Monitoring

Transparency

Follow Up

Participation

Planning

Information

Audit Agencies

Local Council

Performance Assessment
Feedback Mechanism
(Complaints)
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a. Preventive Control
A closer look at the preventive control system at the local level in Egypt reveals
that the status of each mechanism and how they all operate in an interconnected
fashion significantly impact the effectiveness of the Monitoring and Follow-up
System as discussed below:
Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
For internal control systems to work as intended, follow-up efforts must be preceded
and supported by an accurate information and data system that serves the local
planning process and feeds into an operational control system. Such ICT system
should provide reliable data and comprehensive information on different issues
such as, the status of infrastructure and public utilities at different administrative
levels. This information has to be accessible and available to citizens and to be
further used in assessing the local needs for projects and funds, hence guide
an effective local planning process. Locally, it was found that every governorate
has a large department for ICT that is directly affiliated to the governor’s office.
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However, even though this department is mandated with aiding governors to
make informed decision about planning and follow up on the progress of all
projects carried out in their governorates jurisdiction, there is a serious local
government information gap. “The work of the Central Department for ICT is very
weak. When the Governor needs to obtain any information, he requests it from the
Ministries or their affiliated service directorates,”19
This information gap constitutes a major obstacle that induces corruption and
hence, must be overcome to enhance the effectiveness of the local administration
system. Providing accurate data and meaningful access to information must be
achieved, not only to be incorporated into the local units’ annual plans, but also
to foster a strong preventative control system, thus locally bolster the governance
principles of openness, transparency and accountability.

Local Planning System
The local planning system is an integral part of local administration. Effective
local planning entrenches the principle of participation, which is considered a
step towards realizing an accountable and responsive type of local governance.
Therefore, the more advanced, participative and responsive the local planning
system is, the less corruption occurs.
In Egypt, the planning system and its dynamics at the local level are constrained by
many factors. First, a collaborative and participatory planning process is absent.
Previously, Local Popular Councils (LPCs) were involved in the planning process
through proposing new projects and activities, as well as approving the proposed
overall plan and budget of the governorate. But since their dissolution in 2011,
only the executive branch of the government makes decisions regarding investment
plans and allocation of resources, which undermines the effectiveness of the
local planning process. Second, in addition to the deficiency in the information
system, discussed earlier, and with the absence of Local Councils, the planning
system lost a main source of information pertaining to setting citizens’ priorities.
Moreover, due to the weak involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
in the planning process, their poor communication with the government, as well
as the lack of incorporation of citizens’ complaints and needs, the planning
process is neither integrative nor comprehensive. Third, the existing line-item
type of budget that is used by both central and local governments weakens the
local planning process, by paying prime attention to the input/output and overlooking
the performance and outcomes. This undermines the Monitoring and Evaluation
(M&E) process. Fourth, despite that some service directorates, such as education
and health, were deconcentrated, they still rely on the ministries’ central plans
and only develop cosmetic plans locally. This could be attributed to the duality
of affiliation, as they are affiliated administratively to the governorate and technically
and financially to the central ministries, which do not reflect the real needs of
local citizens.
19 Quoted from an interview with a high-level official in Giza Governorate.
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The absence of participatory planning, budgeting and monitoring impedes high
quality, efficient services and local development that are tailored to local needs.
In addition, it leads to mismanagement and misallocation of resources at the
local level, contributing to the spread of many forms of corruption and therefore,
leading to an ineffective local administration system.

Follow-up and Monitoring System
A strong internal follow-up and monitoring system is considered the primary
buffer zone against corruption. It is crucial for ensuring accountability and
transparency. Both follow-up and monitoring are regular and embedded in-process
activities. Follow-up is mainly about collecting information and reporting it as
is. Whereas, monitoring is more of a purposive process that incorporates observing
patterns and verifying progress against previously set objectives.
There are two main departments in most governorates responsible for this type
of preventive control. The first is the Plan and Monitoring Department (PMD),
which is mandated with monitoring the implementation of investment plans at
the different local levels. The second is the Field Monitoring Department (FMD),
which is responsible for checking on road occupations, as well as any violations
related to public utilities through on the ground inspections and reporting on the
situation to the different stakeholders within the governorate’s jurisdiction.
PMD’s role is to monitor projects from design to operation to ensure allocating
adequate resources, providing needed services and hence achieving the developmental
objectives, yet, this department only plays a follow-up role. It pays more attention
to budget spending. “The PMD department is not effective at all, despite its
existence at all administrative levels. It only concentrates on spending the money they
have without any consideration to the operations part.”20 The common practice
of PMD puts more emphasis on the input/output means of verification rather
than performance/outcome. Shifting away from such practice necessitates the
urgency of linking the “Investment” chapter (Ch.6) in the budget to chapters
of “Wages and Compensations of Employees” (Ch.1) and “Purchases of Goods
and Services” (Ch.2). This can be achieved through changing the nature of the
existing budget system from dual-budget to a unified one, in which one entity
takes on the responsibility of the budget.
As for the FMD, it only exists at the governorate’s Diwan, and its strength depends
on the characters of both the governor and the head of the department. Moreover,
the nature and quality of work of this department differ from one governorate to
the other, since 1) there is no clear consistent structure that precisely identifies
the affiliation and shapes the mandates of the FMD. 2) The resources available
in FMDs, such as vehicles needed for field monitoring, modern methods and
technological devices for speeding up reporting and follow-up, in addition to
qualified human resources to execute these mandates, vary greatly across the
27 governorates.
20 Quoted from an interview with a high-level official in Giza Governorate.

19

What is Wrong Exactly?

This weak and inconsistent status of the follow-up and monitoring systems
negatively affect the accountability mechanism and hence stimulate corruption.

• Complementary Mechanisms
The management of citizens’ complaints is a complementary mechanism functioning
as a feedback tool, which aids both the Information and Follow-up and Monitoring
systems. A General Department for Serving Citizens, affiliated to the governor
exists in every governorate, where it receives citizens’ complaints physically
and electronically. This department is mandated with examining and dealing
with citizens’ complaints, in cooperation with the sub-departments of citizens’
services existing at all service directorates and at the lower administrative levels
of the governorate. It is worth noting that a monthly report detailing the number
of complaints received and replied to, in every governorate, is submitted to the
Cabinet of Ministers. However, although significant efforts are exerted to raise
the responsiveness level of the local government towards its citizens, this system
is not always effective. On one hand, the electronic complaints system is not
available at every governorate. On the other hand, the system needs to be
updated to perform a thorough analysis that helps in categorizing and channeling
citizens’ complaints, and to provide sufficient feedback that ensures solving
the problem. This lack of an effective complaints mechanism contributes to
broadening the trust gap between citizens and the government, which is one of
the key implications of corruption.

b. Detective Control
The detective control system encompasses a key oversight body represented in
“Local Councils”, in addition to other “Control and Audit Agencies” that play a
fundamental role in tightening the control over the local administration system
to guarantee its effectiveness and integrity.

Local Councils
The local council plays a vital role in the local administration system. The
strength of its mandates and how effectively they are implemented, in addition
to its formation, maintain the balance in the local administration system.
Article 180 of the constitution grants the local councils the mandates of following
up on the implementation of the development plan; monitoring the different
activities. It also authorizes them to oversee the executive authorities using
tools such as providing proposals, and submitting questions, briefing motions,
interrogations and others; as well as withdrawing confidence from the heads of
local units.
It is worth noting that since 2011, the Local Popular Councils, which were
superseded by the local councils in the constitution, were dissolved. This means
that the oversight mandate of these councils is left to the executive authority,
which represents a clear distortion in the accountability mechanism, since the
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executive body is also the oversight body. Such distortion in the checks and balances
system can lead to prevalence of corruption within the local administration.
Furthermore, with its elected representation, local councils are considered a
fundamental arm for the social accountability mechanism, thus its absence
undermines the degree of participation and transparency, which thereby encourages
the spread of corruption.

Audit System
Having a detective nature, audit systems are essential for effective governance,
as they complement the preventive control systems. Hence, both control systems
support public institutions to achieve accountability and integrity, and enhance
their operations through ensuring the institutions’ legal compliance, control of
corruption, and the quality of preventive control. Presumably, effective
audit institutions should enjoy organizational independence, clear mandates,
unrestricted access to information, professional audit standards, and financial and
human capacity. The audit system pertaining to Egyptian local administration
constitutes various institutions, which originally emanate from the central level.
The mandates of these institutions vary from financial to administrative control,
as discussed further below:

• The Administrative Control Agency (ACA) is a key independent institution

that is mandated with detecting administrative and financial irregularities,
as well as the criminal acts committed by employees during performing their
functions. Recently, the ACA Law No. 54/1964 was amended by Law No.
207/2014 to mandate the ACA with a clear and explicit role of preventing
and combating corruption in public institutions, in addition to formulating
the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and following up on its implementation,
in cooperation with the concerned entities. Although ACA has offices in
each governorate with focal points for each sector, yet, its work is not of a
systematic nature that is based on regular checks and balances. Rather, it is
mainly random and based on claims directed against specific employees for
their unlawful practices and/or job irregularities.

• The Central Audit Organization (CAO) plays a vital role as a detective

control institution that is limited only to financial auditing. It is responsible
for auditing the implementation of the State budget and other independent
budgets, as well as reviewing its final accounts. CAO identifies financial
irregularities and reports it to the concerned entities, one of which is ACA. It
also submits a report to the parliament. One of the impediments to curbing
corruption is that these reports are inaccessible and are not disseminated,
not only to the public but also to many officials. This lack of disclosure of
information hinders any efforts to estimate the economic and social cost of
corruption, as well as its magnitude.
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• Inspection and Follow-up Agency (IFA) is another important audit institution,

affiliated to MoLD. IFA was established with the mandate of curbing corruption
through 1) monitoring and inspection over the local leadership, as well as,
2) following up on and monitoring the implementation of the developmental
projects to ensure effective operations. Some of the IFA employees even have
the judicial seizure power, in order to accelerate the process of transferring the
detected corruption cases to the Administrative Prosecution. However, due
to the limited financial and human capacity, the work of the IFA has become
unsystematic and of an arbitrary nature. As a result of these arbitrary acts,
IFA has deviated from its role. As time passed, it has turned out to be more
of a securitized entity that is focused on tracking and prosecuting people,
especially after being granted the “judicial seizure”, rather than inspecting
and detecting the malfunctions in the local system.
Despite the existence of various audit institutions, the linkage and coordination
among these institutions are absent. The rampant level of corruption indicates
the failure of such institutions in dealing with its magnitude.
Obviously, the current state of preventive and detective control systems in local
administration is discouraging. Despite the exerted efforts, the preventive system
falls short of acting proactively to curb corruption, which is likely to widen the
trust gap between citizens and government. Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of
the detective system, as well as the absence of social accountability mechanisms
contribute to maintaining the status quo of corruption.

6. Lack of Integrated and Locally Directed State Efforts
Citizens, government officials and parliamentarians are highly aware of the
prevalence of corruption and its manifestations at the national and local levels.
However, for a long time, no concrete actions or strategies were taken to combat
it. With the adoption of a new constitution in 2014, great attention was paid
to fighting corruption. In Article 218, the constitution stated that government
control agencies are obliged to fight corruption and to promote the principles of
integrity and transparency to ensure the sound performance of public functions
and preserve public funds. As a response, the GoE launched the National
Anti-Corruption Strategy 2014-2018 (NACS), containing ten objectives that
focus on different ways to curb corruption. Additionally, the GoE adopted the
Public Administrative Reform Vision in 2014, among the objectives of which
is to promote transparency and integrity in the public administration system
through a program for fighting corruption.
Moreover, in 2016, the Government adopted its Sustainable Development
Strategy: Egypt’s Vision 2030 (SDS 2030) to shape the public policies of the
country until 2030. The economic dimension of SDS 2030 includes a pillar
on “Transparency and Effectiveness of Government’s Institutions,” which pays
great attention to fighting corruption and enhancing the effectiveness of the
public administration system. Furthermore, in terms of achieving the objectives of
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this pillar, a new Civil Service Law No. 81/2016 was enacted. The law obliged
all public officials to comply with the code of conduct set forth by the Central
Agency for Organization and Administration (CAOA).
Despite these various endeavors, corruption continues to prevail in the local
administration system in Egypt. This might be attributed to the fragmentation
and lack of integration between the government’s different efforts. Furthermore,
the aforementioned visions and strategy disregarded the local level. For example,
in the objectives of “Raising Public Awareness about the Risks of Corruption
and the Importance of Fighting it”, and “Building Confidence between Citizens
and Government” in the NACS, local administration is not mentioned as an
implementation partner. This shows that the central government formulates
policies and strategies without consulting with the local administration, which
could be due to the lack of trust in the local capacities and the tendency to hold
power at the central level.
Incontrovertibly, pointing out the root causes of corruption is essential not only
to curb it, but also to deepen the understanding of the origins of other problems
and challenges. Thorough comprehension of the overall picture allows for shaping
and linking reform policies and initiatives to tackle the interrelated challenges.
Analysis shows that corruption is deeply rooted in the low levels of effectiveness,
transparency, accountability and participation within the local administration
system. These low levels emanate from some characteristics that dominate the
local administration system, such as a decline in institutional thinking, especially
with regards to the decision-making process. It is very common to find decisions
made based on the philosophy of the head of the institution rather than a clear
vision that leads this institution.
Although, the government’s commitment towards combating corruption is clearly
stated, political will towards institutionalizing the issue of curbing corruption
through mainstreaming governance principles and mechanisms within the local
administration system is still weak.

IV. Strategic Directions and Engines of Change
Unquestionably, the fragile status of accountability, transparency and participation
in the local administration system induces corruption. Addressing the root causes
of the prevalent corruption needs serious and comprehensive local administration
reforms, which requires government institutions to join forces in order to devise
change in the local administration system in Egypt. In an attempt to draw a map for
curbing corruption in the local system, two sets of recommended policy actions,
depicted in Figure (3), are proposed. The first set “Strategic Directions” involves
a bundle of structural policies that should act as an overarching framework within
which the local administration operates. The second set “Engines of Change”
encompasses action-oriented recommendations that represent a path towards
curbing corruption in local administration. The two sets of policy recommendations
are geared towards establishing and operationalizing the aforementioned core
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principles of good governance, since it would strengthen the local administration
governance system that would thereby help in curbing corruption. Additionally,
it should be noted that both sets are interrelated, interdependent and mutually
reinforcing, rather than being alternatives to each other. However, the government
can decide on which elements under each set to start with, taking into account
the challenges, opportunities and required timeframe for implementing each.
Figure (3): Strategic Directions and Engines of Change (4Cs)
SDS 2030

Control

Codes
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Single Coordination Mechanism
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a. Strategic Directions
Before delving into the specific set of policy recommendations, general
suggestions should be taken into consideration:

• First, being the overarching document that shapes and determines the
State’s policies and strategies for the next 12 years, SDS 2030, should mirror
local administration reform. In its ten pillars, targets and Key Performance
Indicators (KPIs), SDS 2030 should be further detailed in order to reflect
on the local level. Such reflection would deepen the understanding of the
existing gaps in the local administration system and hence, would allow for
closing these gaps and adopting more integrated and harmonized plans between
the central and local levels.
• Second, the NACS should allow for the participation of local representatives,

including executive and civil society leadership from different administrative
levels, as an integral part in implementing the strategy, to ensure the effective
achievement of its objectives at the local level.
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• Third, since ACA is the entity responsible for developing and implementing

the NACS, then it should lead, as a single responsible entity, the harmonization
and coordination of anti-corruption efforts among the various government
institutions to guarantee their integration and ensure effective and collective
efforts in curbing corruption.

• Fourth, moving towards a balanced distribution of power between the central

and local levels, or in other words decentralization, is a prerequisite to address
the shortcomings of local government. It will also guarantee resourcefulness
of governorates through adequate allocation of resources and control over
local revenues, and enhance local community oversight responsibilities,
thereby reinforcing good governance principles and decreasing the levels
of corruption. This requires the government to fulfill the constitutional
obligations of shifting towards fiscal and administrative decentralization. It
also necessitates significant legal changes to delegate responsibilities and
empower those at the local level with fiscal and functional tools that would
help in shrinking the level of corruption.

• Fifth, between promises and real change, there is “political will.” A dedicated,

consistent and sustained political will throughout all levels of government
is the driver for a real transformation of the local administration system in
Egypt. It is also crucial for the development of an integrated framework to
fight corruption and integrate the principles of governance at the local level.

b. Engines of Change
Reinventing the local administration system in Egypt requires working on four
fundamental equally weighted Engines of Change, namely: Codes, Control, Capacity
and Culture, in other words, the 4Cs.

1. Local Administration CODES
Local Administration Codes encompass a systematic and comprehensive compilation
of all laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to the local administration system.
This requires profound legal reform that includes the following:

• Revising, harmonizing and consolidating the Local Administration Law No.

43 of 1979 and all other related laws: Unified Building Law No. 119 of
2008; Planning Law No. 60 of 1961; State General Budget Law No. 53 of
73 in a single law that guarantees an effective local government process.
The consolidated law should also be clearly geared towards master planning,
improving the quality of public service delivery through simplifying the
administrative procedures, as well as establishing patterns of responsibility,
authority and accountability that do not fragment and overlap. It should be
noted that both the Local Administration and Unified Planning Laws have
been drafted and are pending parliament’s approval. These laws should tackle
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challenges related to the integration between spatial and socioeconomic
planning, transformation towards decentralization, and clarification of explicit
roles and responsibilities at the different local administrative levels.

• Adopting an Anti-Corruption Law that designates corruption as a crime, and thereby

classifies and details the different forms of corruption and related articles existing
in all laws. Although there are many provisions on curbing corruption, however
they are scattered throughout the Penal Code and other various codes of conduct.
The Penal Code in Egypt extends criminal liability to include non-public officials.
In addition, civil servants are often unaware of the existence of these provisions,
so they end up violating them. Therefore, adopting a law that exclusively deals
with the already existing corruption practices and that stipulates penalties to be
imposed on both corrupt citizens and corrupt civil servants alike is favorable for
many reasons. First, it will help the government to situate itself in a competent
position with regards to curbing corruption, rather than being part of it. Second,
the law can be an effective tool for raising awareness and fostering a culture of
anti-corruption in local administration. In addition, it can oblige civil servants to
promote the principles of transparency and integrity in their agencies, and hence
integrate the principles of good governance within public administration.

• Adopting a Freedom of Information Law that guarantees the right of citizens

to receive information, and obtain statistics or data in a simplified way. It
should also guarantee publishing the reports of the audit agencies and other
information. This law promotes accountability and enhances the citizen’s
confidence and trust in the government, through granting citizens the right
of holding the government accountable.

2. Local Administration CONTROL
There should be a balance between preventive and detective control mechanisms.
This would be attained through the following:

• Measuring the magnitude and cost of corruption is key in examining the

robustness of preventive and detective institutions. It serves as a baseline
for identifying risk areas where corruption might easily occur and, hence, it
supports the control institutions to undertake informed corrective actions to
detect and curb corruption. Within this context, developing a Local Corruption
Perception Index (LCPI) would be a facilitating instrument in measuring the
cost of corruption. This LCPI would be based on surveys and other diagnostic
tools to identify the pitfalls in the local activities and operations, as well as
help in evaluating anti-corruption efforts and interventions.

• Establishing a vigorous coordination and cooperation mechanism among

audit institutions to ensure that they work together. Such a mechanism
would strengthen their connection and help them function effectively in
detecting irregularities at the local level.
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• Establishing social accountability mechanisms to complement the formal

accountability ones, and serve as a platform in which various stakeholders
such as civil society, media, private sector and academia, would work together.
The participation of these actors is imperative in bridging the accountability
gaps in the local administration system. In addition, accelerating the process
of electing Local Councils is indispensable, since they are a fundamental
arm for social accountability. This would ameliorate transparency and citizen
engagement, which are considered principal building blocks for social
accountability, and accordingly, curbing corruption.

3. Implementation CAPACITY
The effectiveness of the local administration system is mediated by the quality
of implementation. Therefore, building the organizational capacity of local
institutions on one hand, and human capacity on the other hand, to “implement”
and “best deliver” are of primary importance.

• Building local organizational capacity contributes to a well-functioning local

administration and opens the door for innovation. This can be achieved through:
first, developing a unified basic structure for the 27 governorates. These unified
basic structures should enable better functioning and performance through
providing clear roles and responsibilities for each local unit. They should also be
flexible to allow for the preservation of the nature of each governorate, whether
touristic, agricultural, industrial, etc., as this would feed into their local planning
and investment. Second, strengthening the ICT systems at the local level by
reinforcing e-government practices to decrease the cash transactions and
reduce the interaction between citizens and civil servants is crucial for curbing
corruption and enhancing the effectiveness of service provision. Bolstering such
systems would also strengthen the linkage between the different local
administrative levels on one hand, and on the local-central level on the other
hand, which allows for more well-informed decisions. Third, ensuring the
provision of adequate finances to allocate the needed resources for carrying
out the operations of the follow-up and field monitoring, and reinforce the local
units’ capacity for efficient and effective services delivery.

• Building local human capacity should start with proper selection of leadership

positions and drawing a clear career path where local civil servants can grow
and get promoted. This would attract high calibers and cultivate their sense
of ownership, which in turn would boost their eagerness and motivation to
better carry out their responsibilities.

4. CULTURE of Rule of Law
The prevalent culture of legal violations is a major threat to the rule of law. The
behavior of both civil servants and citizens should shift towards respecting and
abiding by the law.
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• Promoting a culture of rule of law among both civil servants and citizens
represents the entry point for reconstituting the relationship and trust between
citizens and the State. It also paves the way for deeper local administration
reform by reducing resistance and aligning citizens and civil servants towards
curbing corruption. This should start with the government guaranteeing that
every person is subject to the law and initiating nationwide campaigns that
raise awareness about the forms and implications of corruption, as well as
its economic and social cost to the country and its development.
Prior to executing the abovementioned elements, the multifaceted challenges
and opportunities must be highlighted in order to guide the government in
formulating a workable action plan for implementation. Moreover, it is worth
noting that in addition to the specific opportunities of each element of the 4Cs,
there are some cross-cutting opportunities which the government can capitalize
on to stimulate efforts of curbing corruption. These opportunities are laid out in
the overarching SDS 2030 and the current efforts of revising it, which create
a window for proposing amendments that would feed into the desired reform.
Additionally, the current NACS 2014-2018 is another opportunity, where the
government can build on and take the local level into consideration when
formulating the new NACS. The following table further details specific contextual
challenges and opportunities, accompanying each policy element of the 4Cs.
4Cs

CODES

CONTROL
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Challenges

Opportunities

• Multiplicity of actors.
• Existence of power
relations and tensions
between actors
involved regarding
granted authorities.
• Bureaucratic culture
resisting information
sharing.
• Limited financial
resources for
developing LCPI.
• Existing culture
of excluding CSOs,
private sector
and other social
accountability actors
in reform.

• Existence of a draft State
General Planning Law that
addresses most of integrated local
planning challenges.

Expected
Timeframe

Medium/
Long term

• Existence of strong private sector
and donor organizations to provide
financial assistance for reform.
• Existence of draft Local
Administration Law in the
Parliament, pending discussion
Short/
and approval.
Medium
• Authorizing Local Councils - by
term
Constitution - with powerful tools
to exercise oversight and control
over the executive authority.
• Mandating ACA as a single
responsible entity to lead anticorruption efforts.
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• Complexity and
lengthy process
to change the
organizations’
structures into
more effective and
functional ones.
• Limited financial
resources for updating
ICT infrastructure
and building human
CAPACITY capacity in a
sustainable manner.
• Misdistribution of
local administration
staff.
• Constrained
capacity for securing
local financial
resources.

CULTURE

• Legacy of mistrust
between government
and citizens.
• Difficulty of
changing the social
behavior and attitude
of both civil servants
and citizens.

• Recent government orientation
towards digital transformation
technologies and supporting ICT
systems.
• Existing government efforts
in restructuring government
institutions.
• New Civil Service Law that
touches upon Human Resources
Management, including
employees’ recruitment,
performance appraisal and
training and development.
• Existing donor and international
organizations that would support
and provide funds.
• The newly established National
Academy for Youth Rehabilitation
and Training to build the capacity
of young civil servants.
• Sakkara Training Center, which
serves as a national training hub
for local civil servants.
• Existing media campaigns to
curb corruption.
• Willingness and readiness of
a broad set of actors such as
influencers and business figures
to engage in anti-corruption
media campaigns.

Short/
Medium
term

Long term

As illustrated, “Strategic Directions” constitute the founding structural changes
needed for an effective local administration reform that curbs corruption. This
clearly emphasizes the indispensability of “political will” as a precondition for
successful adoption of functional policies. It also reflects the need for engaging
a broad base of multiple actors, including different ministries, governmental
organizations, and academic and research institutions, in addition to local and
international advisors. Though the multiplicity of actors is a challenge of its
own, their interplay in an integrative manner represents the catalyst and main
guarantee for creating an environment conducive to change.
Furthermore, the complexity of local administration, the intangible nature of
corruption and the trust gap between the government and citizens require the
former to start by focusing on “Quick Wins” or the early, short-term actions
having a high potential of success. Such strategy will allow the government to
build up momentum and open up space for broader and gradual reform, and
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will ensure tangible improvement in service delivery and hence, contribute to
close the present trust gap.
Identifying the right blend of policy elements that would yield quick wins or
those which represent deeper, long-term goals and need to be gradually implemented
will hinge on existing contextual realities. This demands and paves the way for
proposing a functional mechanism to lead implementation and bring about the
needed reform.

V. Leading Vehicle of Implementation
Clearly, achieving the strategic directions for effective local administration
transformation to curb corruption needs high-level coordination among the
different State institutions. Overcoming the coordination hurdle between
government’s agencies in Egypt necessitates forming a dedicated leading
vehicle for implementation. This vehicle can take the form of a High-Level
Committee that is mission-driven, time bound and reports directly to the
President, to guarantee the gradual implementation of reform policies, oversight
and communicating progress to the community.
The membership of this committee should include:

• ACA: Head of Committee, since it is the principle entity mandated with

developing and implementing NACS.
• MoLD: Technical Secretariat, as it is responsible for local administration
reform and shifting towards decentralization.
• Local Representative: local executive leaderships and Local Councils’
representatives from the different administrative levels.
• Government Agencies: relevant ministries such as, ministries of Planning,
Monitoring and Administrative Reform; Communication and Information
Technology; Housing, Utilities and Urban Development.
• Parliamentarians: representatives from the Local Administration Committee
• CSOs: including NGOs and academia.
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and meaningful solutions to Egypt’s chronic and acute policy dilemmas can be
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The Public Policy HUB provideS a processing unit where policy teams are formed on
a regular basis, combining experienced policy scholars/mentors with young creative
policy analysts, provide them with the needed resources, training, exposure, space,
tools, networks, knowledge and contacts, to enable them to come up with sound, rigorous
and yet creative policy solutions that have a greater potential to be effectively advocated
and communicated to the relevant policy makers and to the general public.
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